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It is part of a civil servants job description to be responsive to its political leadership as 
well as to uphold legal norms. But what happens when the two types of demands conflict? 
When legal norms stipulate one thing, but political leaders want another. In modern de-
mocracies, observing the rule of law is no less important than holding elections. Respect 
for legal norms by those who exercise government authority is widely regarded as the 
cornerstone of democracy and good governance. The question is what role the bureaucra-
cy plays when it comes to defending legal norms vis-à-vis its political leaders. This article 
investigates this question theoretically as well as empirically. First by exploring the nor-
mative and positive theoretical issues involved, and secondly by examining the institu-
tional context and behavior of the civil service in the Danish state administration. The 
analysis draws on survey data where civil servants have been asked to respond to fictive 
scenarios that present a conflict between obedience to the minister and observing the law. 
A substantial share of the civil servants – up to ¼ - choose to compromise legal obliga-
tions to comply with Ministerial requests. The findings suggest that educational back-
ground, position in the hierarchy, and work place and function matters. Lawyers, leaders, 
those who work in departments – as opposed to agencies – are thus less likely to show 
willingness to compromise their legal obligations than their colleagues are.  
 
Introduction 
What role should civil servants play in a high quality democracy to ensure that 
government conforms to the rule of law – and what role do they actually play? 
At a time when the proliferation of populist sentiments is challenging political 
and legal institutions in many mature democracies (Foa and Mounk, 2016, Foa 
and Mounk, 2017), the role of law is moving to the top of the agenda. Populist 
parties across Europe are threatening the consensus on some of the key tenets of 
liberal democracy, namely the idea of limits to majority rule, the sanctity of 
individual rights as well as the principles of division of powers (Albertazzi and 
Mueller, 2013). Such developments make it important to look closer at the role 
of key institutions of the state in upholding the rule of law. In this article, I take a 
closer look at the role of the civil service in this respect. Firstly, by exploring the 
normative and positive theoretical issues involved, and secondly, by examining 
the role of the civil service in Denmark in conflicts between political pressure 
and the law. 
At first glance, the normative question – how civil servants ought to act - is 
deceptively simple to answer; the rule of law is widely regarded as the bedrock of 
a well-functioning democracy  (see O'Donnell, 2004). Some argue that the rule of 
law is not just a precondition of democracy, but renders it effective (Alexander et 
al., 2012). Adherence to laws by those who wield governmental power is not only 
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a critical safeguard to protect ‘the people’ from abuses of power, but also ensures 
that legislative majorities control the executive branch. An independent judicial 
system able to sanction violations typically figures at the top of the list of factors 
believed to underpin the rule of law (e.g. Russell and O'Brien, 2001). It creates 
tangible incentives for conformity with legal precepts that positive theories of 
political behaviour predict are fundamental. While dread of punishment is prob-
ably a necessary condition for realising such ends, many believe that it is not 
sufficient, but requires normative underpinnings. Institutional incentives as well 
as normative underpinning are therefore likely to play a role in how the civil 
service performs. 
Civil servants essentially work in a subservient position to democratically 
elected officials and are expected to be responsive to the political agendas and 
policy aims of their governments. As Dahlstrom puts it, ‘Elected politicians have 
a legitimate interest in controlling what government organisations do’ 
(Dahlstrom and Niklasson, 2013). However, the extent to which the political 
heads of the institutions of government can control them varies considerably 
across counties, as well as across policy areas within them. Some enjoy relative-
ly high levels of autonomy, while others operate under more direct political 
control (Peters and Pierre, 2001, Yesilkagit and van Thiel, 2008).  In most de-
mocracies today politicians are under more or less constant pressure to respond 
effectively to a wide array of issues that can affect their standing in the volatile 
polls and secure re-election. At times this can create incentives for politicians to 
push for politically expedient solutions at odds with established legal principles 
of public administration. In addition to the ongoing demand of electoral competi-
tion, a more serious challenge to the rule of law may emerge when politicians, 
who view certain laws – particularly those of a higher order that cannot easily be 
changed (e.g. EU laws, international conventions or constitutional principles) - 
as impediments to realising the will of the people. It raises the question of how 
civil servants should and do respond when put in situations where they have to 
choose between loyalty to their elected superiors and adherence to legal norms.  
What specific incentives and norms govern the behaviour of civil servants 
when it comes to adherence to legal principles is an empirical question, the an-
swer to which is likely to vary considerably. The quality of the public bureaucra-
cy is widely regarded as an important determinant of corruption (Treisman, 
2000, Tanzi, 1998), but we do not know very much about compliance with legal 
standards in public bodies. As Huberts et al write, we are ‘in the dark about the 
level of compliance within government bodies with respect to laws and regula-
tions in comparison to members of the public and business’ (Huberts et al., 
2006). We know civil servants may experience conflicts between legal obliga-
tions and other public values such as ‘effectiveness’ for instance (de Graaf and 
Paanakker, 2015, Beck Jørgensen and Vrangbæk, 2011). We do not know much 
about how they deal with such conflicts particularly when they involve respon-
siveness to superiors versus adherence to legal standards. 
The Danish civil service is a particularly interesting case for exploring this 
dilemma. In general country comparisons, Denmark lies securely at the top of 





the world ratings in terms of the quality of democracy and governance 
(Economist, 2016, WEF, 2007). In the most recent corruption rating, it was 
ranked the second least corrupt country in the world (Transparency International, 
2018) The civil service is a meritocracy – a feature which is widely regarded as a 
key precondition for high quality government. In other words, it is a case where 
we might expect a high degree of compliance with legal standards. However, 
Denmark also has government institutions with few barriers to political control 
over the civil service (cf. below). Politically, Denmark generally has a strongly 
competitive party system with high electoral volatility and low barriers to entry 
for new parties (Bischoff, 2006). It has seen the rise to power of a populist party, 
the Danish People’s Party, which on several occasions has proposed policy and 
voiced opinions – particularly on the issue of immigration - that conflict with 
legal principles, and expressed scepticism towards compliance with higher order 
law. The Danish People’s party has served as permanent support party to the 
government for long periods, 2001-2011, and again 2015-present (Christiansen, 
2016). Many observers believe that its positions – particularly on issues related 
to immigration – have exerted significant influence on government. In any case, 
several highly publicised cases involving violations of rules in the civil service, 
some related to issues of immigration, have raised public and scholarly attention 
to the matter (see Knudsen and Boye Koch, 2014, Tynell, 2016). These factors 
make Denmark an interesting case for examining the responses of the civil ser-
vice to cross-pressures between legal obligations and political demands. On a 
practical level, unique survey data on responses of Danish civil servants to di-
lemmas of obedience versus adherence to the law make it possible to explore this 
subject.   
In the following, I will first outline the theoretical positions in the literature 
on the factors that influence civil servants behavior. This sets the background for 
the following discussion of the key formal and informal characteristics of the 
Danish state administration that can be expected to influence bureaucratic behav-
ior. Thirdly, the survey data is presented, the interpretation of the legal scenarios 
discussed, and analyzed. The first part of the analysis focuses on quantitative 
description and examination of associations, while the second part discusses 
statements made by the civil servants as commentary to the themes. Finally, the 
results of the analysis are discussed.  
 
Drivers of bureaucratic behavior and legal constraints 
What makes civil servants resist pressures to ‘bend the rules’ and what induces 
willingness to side-step rules to meet political ends? Explanations of behavior in 
an organizational context typically draw on one of two major strands of theory 
associated with rational actor models on the one hand, and various types of soci-
ological accounts on the other.   
The rational actor perspective associated with the idea of the rational and 
self-interested individual plays a dominant role in explanations of political and 
administrative behavior. The systematic development of this idea and its ramifi-






cations for behaviors and outcomes in a range of different economic, political 
and societal arenas is found in rational and public choice theory (e.g. Downs, 
1964, Niskanen, 1994). The theory rests on two assumptions. The first is that 
‘rationality’, which entails weighing costs and benefits of different courses of 
action is the basis of human agency. Most applications of the theory 
acknowledge human limitations with respect to the ability to calculate all rele-
vant consequences of different courses of action however expresses human be-
ings make mistakes and use short-cuts in their decision-making processes 
(Simon, 1987). The second concerns the types of interests that actors seek to 
maximize. Self-interest is key, which includes increasing wealth such as well as 
social prestige or power (e.g. North, 1990). In relation to observing legal obliga-
tions in a democracy, Weingast formulates the rational choice position very 
succinctly: ‘the force of law is not normative – citizens and political officials do 
not obey law because of a duty to obey law. Instead, political officials obey the 
law because they have incentives to do so.’ (Weingast, 2003: 109).  
However, far from all agree with this position and emphasize other drivers 
of behavior beyond simple self-interests. Perceptions of what is ‘right’ may 
influence actors who wish to fulfill obligations dictated by a role or identity 
defined by their group or organizational membership. The ‘logic of appropriate-
ness’ falls into this category: ‘behavior is seen as driven by rules of appropriate 
or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions’ (March and Olsen, 1995: 30-
31).This perspective on human agency draws on socialization theories. Individu-
als acquire preferences for action by internalizing norms, values and principles 
prevalent in the groups or institutions they are a part of by cognitive or emotive 
processes (e.g. Sears, 1993, Conover and Feldman, 1984). In the literature on 
public administration, the term ‘public values’ has been used to describe drivers 
of behavior that go beyond simple self-interest. PublKric values refer to stand-
ards for conduct that include honesty, integrity, efficiency as well as the rule of 
law, and include ‘principles on which governments and policies should be 
based’(Jorgensen and Bozeman, 2007: 13). As Andersen et al. discuss, public 
values can be seen as indispensable to a well-functioning public sector, and the 
cornerstone of ‘good governance’. Rather than having a single set of values, 
different sets of values can be described  – each associated with a particular 
mode of governance.  For instance, ‘Hierarchy’ enshrines values associated with 
the traditional Weberian bureaucracy, such as rule-following, due process, neu-
trality and loyalty to superiors, while ‘Market’ refers to orientation towards cus-
tomer service, cost-effictiveness and responsiveness to demand. They also men-
tion ‘clan’ values tied to groups and ‘network’ values. Given that the different 
values do not always support the same courses of action, value conflicts are a 
recurrent phenomenon (see also Beck Jørgensen and Vrangbæk, 2011).  
In a rational consequential logic, we expect civil servants to comply with 
pressures to bend or break the rules in service to their superiors, if the gains 
outweigh the losses (or risk of losses). As Kingston puts it ‘‘any minister who 
makes it clear that they will use their power against the career of anyone who 
stands up to them will in fact meet no resistance at all, because the costs to indi-





viduals is too great” (Kingston, 2002). If non-conformity with rules is either 
unlikely to be discovered or sanctioned, and there are immediate rewards associ-
ated with following dictates from superiors, the incentives are clear.  Job security 
and prospects of advancement are powerful incentives for civil servants, but 
whether a minister has direct power over careers depends on the degree of au-
tonomy of the relevant government institution. Naturally, the potential benefits 
of compliance must outweigh risks of exposure and its anticipated consequences. 
For some types of functions and tasks, such risks may be high due to the pres-
ence of control or high level of attention, while they are small and insignificant 
for others (de Graaf and Paanakker, 2015).  
If civil servants are guided by public values and norms for ‘appropriate be-
havior’, the balance of the decision-making equation changes from calculation of 
consequences to choosing what is right.  It requires very context specific 
knowledge to make meaningful predictions concerning actions of civil servants 
in situations involving orders from superiors that conflict with legal rules, how-
ever (Witesman and Walters, 2015). As mentioned above, both ‘rule-following’ 
and ‘loyalty to superiors’ constitutes core values of the Weberian bureaucratic 
model and conflict of values even within the same category may therefore arise 
(see overview in Krause and Meier, 2003). Comparative studies emphasize that 
merit recruitment is important because it ‘fosters an ethos of professionalism in 
the civil service’ (Rauch and Evans, 2000). ‘Whereas politicians are accountable 
to citizens via regular elections, merit recruitment ensures that bureaucrats are 
accountable to their professional peers and the goals of the organisations’ 
(Dahlstrom and Niklasson, 2013, Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen, 2016). The 
mechanism suggested here works by fostering loyalty to the civil service rather 
than to its political leaders.  
 
The Danish civil service – Political control, incentives and norms 
As discussed above, the features that are particularly important for the balance of 
responsiveness versus legality are what powers politicians have over careers and 
tasks of civil servants, as well as the prospects of sanctions on the one hand. One 
the other, it is question of meritocracy and professional values. In the following, 
we will focus on the key characteristics of the Danish state institutions in this 
respect. 
 
Ministerial powers and constraints 
Denmark relies on a hierarchical model of ministerial government, which im-
plies that authority – as well as responsibility - is concentrated in the office of 
the individual government minister (§13-15 of the constitution). The minister is 
not only the political, but also the administrative head of a ministry, and has 
formal the authority to issue instructions to civil servants. In fact, ministers have 
wide powers to direct business falling within his/her portfolio and face few legal 
constraints in this regard (see Finansministeriet, 1998, Nissen et al., 2010, 
Folketinget, 1964, Christensen, 2013). The typical ministry consists of one de-






partment and several agencies reporting to the minister through the department. 
The specific organizational set-up and division of tasks between agencies and 
departments varies considerable across ministries. However, Ministers have 
authority to organize their own ministries and can make changes in the allocation 
of tasks and responsibilities even on an ad hoc basis (Knudsen, 2000). 
Formally, the minister also has wide powers when it comes to hiring/firing 
employees, but in practice they tend to get involved in top level appointments 
only, and delegate this competence to others (Knudsen, 2000, Christensen and 
Grønnegaard, 2004, Bischoff, 2011b). Personnel decisions are subject to legal 
constraints that prevent different forms of discrimination and promote the meri-
tocratic hiring practices that prevail (Gammeltoft-Hansen et al., 2002: 203-209). 
With respect to controlling civil servants, the question of employments contracts 
is important. In the past, civil servants were almost as difficult to get rid of as 
judges, but today ministers can dismiss civil servants on a discretionary basis 
and the rate of turnover of top civil servants has increased significantly 
(Christensen et al., 2014). For the absolute top-level jobs, individual ministers 
need support of their peers (government committee) to make changes. In prac-
tice, ministerial interest in personnel matters is typically confined to the top 
management and interference below that level is not common – although it does 
occur (Bischoff, 2011b) 
 
The role(s) of the civil service 
In Denmark, as elsewhere, politicians request support from the civil service to 
fulfil their complex and demanding political roles. They have become dependent 
on a responsive civil service that delivers qualified political-tactical advice. The 
literature describes different methods for ‘politicizing’ the civil service, i.e. mak-
ing it responsive to the political aims of its leadership. On the one hand, ‘di-
rect/formal politicization’ entails appointment by politicians of staff who are 
loyal to the politicians and/or their political agendas (Bauer and Ege, 2012). The 
risk in this strategy is that it undermines the neutrality of the civil service. More-
over, side-stepping professional merit potentially backfires if unqualified per-
sonnel is recruited  (Kopecký et al., 2012). This type of politicization plays an 
extremely limited role in Denmark where only a few ‘special advisors’ are ap-
pointed directly by the Minister where partisan loyalties may play a role 
(Knudsen, 2011). ‘Professional politicization’, on the other hand, implies that 
professional civil servants are responsive to the political agendas of those they 
serve (Peterson, 2006). What is at issue is ‘to adapt the merit civil service in a 
way that ensures a high degree of political responsiveness’ (Christensen et al., 
2014). Denmark has taken the latter path. Civil servants are required to counsel 
on matters related to political strategy as well as on substantial policy issues. 
This mix has its own term, namely ‘integrated counselling’ (Salomonsen, 2003: 
421) and the ability to give political-tactical advice is considered a key qualifica-
tion for those seeking high ranking positions in the civil service (Jørgensen and 
Rutgers, 2014, Bischoff, 2011). The demand for professionals who can aid poli-
ticians in the political aspects of their work may blur the traditional lines be-





tween politics and public administration, and it raises the question of whether 
civil servants can juggle both roles or whether political expedience will in prac-
tice challenge the protection of legal and professional standards (see Brans and 
Peters, 2012, Christensen et al., 2016).  
 
The legal obligations of the Danish civil service 
As in any mature democracy, the Danish civil service is positively as well as 
negatively, constrained by law. The question is what specific regulations apply 
when civil servants have to balance obedience to superiors with their legal obli-
gations. What takes precedence? At first glance, the duty of civil servants to 
obey the law is clear. Civil servants should always ‘act in accordance with valid 
law. They are not allowed to act in violation of the constitutions or other law, 
including EU law in force.’ (Ministry of Finance, 2015: 20). This formulation 
stems from Codex VII a document prepared by the Ministry of Finance, which 
provides an overview of the duties of Danish civil servants. In a legal review of 
the document, it is stated that the Codex VII summarized existing rules in the 
area, although it is not exhaustive (Bønsing, 2017). The Codex describes how 
civil servants in different ways must make sure to act in accordance with valid 
law. For instance, if there is doubt about the legality of a new proposal for law, it 
states that they are obliged to warn the minister (Codex VII: 21). On the question 
of orders from a minister – or other superior – the guidance is that they should 
‘refuse, if it is clear that the act is illegal’ (ibid: s.21). Correspondingly, it is 
illegal for leaders to require employees to carry out illegal acts, and there are 
several examples of sanctions in such cases (Bønsing, 2017: 2) The duty to obey 
is, however, strongly emphasized in Danish law. Under the penal code §156, 
denial to follow orders is subject to punishment. It is a punishable dereliction of 
duty if a subordinate refuses or otherwise fails to follow an official order (ibid: 
4). In a verdict by the supreme court, the court explained ‘a civil servant should 
faithfully abide by the rules pertaining to his position, c.f. the civil service law 
§10. Among the duties that follow from this, the duty to obey is central’ (cited 
ibid: 4). Naturally, the duty to obey does not apply if the law is illegal. Moreo-
ver, if a civil servant commits an illegal act, the fact that he or she has followed 
an order, does not constitute exculpatory circumstances. The problem therefore 
lies in assessing the legal status of the order. If an order is ‘clearly illegal’, the 
civil servant has a right as well as a duty to refuse’, but if it is not clearly illegal, 
there is a right and duty to obey (ibid: 5). A lot therefore rides on the question of 
whether an act is clearly illegal or just illegal. The implications of this problem 
in practice is discussed further below. 
In short, the Danish system is characterized by few formal institutional bar-
riers to Ministers in relation to the civil service, meritocratic employment prac-
tices with professional politicization, a legal framework that strongly emphasizes 
the duty to obey, but also the duty to act within the confines of the law.  
 






How do civil servants respond to illegal requests?  
How do Danish civil servants respond to clearly illegal requests by superiors? 
What proportion of them chose to obey requests even if it involves violating 
their legal obligations and why do some civil servants heed their legal obliga-
tions, while others disregard them to accommodate the wishes of their superiors? 
In the following section, these questions will be explored by re-examining re-
sponses of civil servants in Denmark to two vignette questions and an open-
ended question included in a survey carried out by the Bo Smith committee 
(BoSmith-Udvalget, 2015)1. The committee published its report on the state of 
the Danish civil service in 2015, and subsequently it made the survey data avail-
able to researchers upon request.  
The purpose of revisiting the survey data and analyzing the results here is to 
go deeper into the responses of the civil servants to the two legal dilemmas pre-
sented in the two vignette questions mentioned above. The Bo Smith commit-
tee’s presentation and interpretation of the survey data have been subjected to 
critique of a methodological as well as legal nature (Boye Koch and Bischoff, 
2018). This critique makes it particularly relevant to take a closer look at what 
conclusions the data sustain. The two vignette questions in the survey are partic-
ularly interesting in this respect. Before analyzing the data, it is necessary to 
present the vignettes and discuss in some detail the positions on what legal obli-
gations civil servants have under Danish law when faced with situations such as 
those presented in the vignettes.  
 
Legal duties of civil servants in the vignette-scenarios 
The vignettes depict situations that touch on legal issues that lie at the heart of 
the rule of law in a democratic state. The first concerns principle of legal basis of 
rules issued by the administration and the second is concerns the requirement 
that case-decisions are based in legal rules. The principle of legality is thus at 
stake in the situations depicted.  
The first vignette - the ‘legal basis-vignette’- has the following wording:  
 
Your minister wishes to have some rules in the area that you work 
with changed very quickly. He is convinced that it can be accom-
plished by issuing an administrative rule. The assessment of your of-
fice is that it would require a change in law, since there is insufficient 
legal basis in existing law to warrant issuing the administrative rule. 
The minister believes that the case is too small/insignificant to justify 
disturbing Parliament (‘Folketinget’) and maintains that the change 
must be possible in the form of an administrative rule. Will you assist 
in this? 
 
The wording of the second ‘case-decision vignette’ is: 
 





You are dealing with a concrete case and you are notified that your 
minister would be pleased to see that the applicant receives a favora-
ble decision. It is apparent from the media coverage that there is wide 
public support for this outcome, and that the minister would be in 
dire straits were the application to be rejected. The law and common 
practice does not make the desired result possible in your opinion. 
Would you assist in giving the permission? 
 
Both vignettes have the same four answer options: 1. Yes, without reservations. 
2. Yes, but I would raise my concerns/reservations to my superior. 3. Only after 
a direct order, and I would warn my superior in unambiguous terms and 4. I 
would clearly say no and not assist.  
The question is how civil servants ought to respond. Do they constitute 
‘clearly illegal’ or merely ‘illegal’ requests? As described above, Danish civil 
servants have a duty not to comply with clearly illegal orders. In all other cases, 
they are obliged by law to obey their superiors. Two professors of Public Law at 
the University of Copenhagen (Ph.D. Michael Gøtze and Dr.Jur  Carsten Hen-
richsen ) interpret the ministerial requests described in the vignettes as ‘clearly 
illegal’ (Boye Koch and Bischoff, 2018: 14-15). As Gøtze has stated in an inter-
view on the matter ‘It is clearly illegal if you understand the small vignettes 
according to their content. It is not just something that is borderline or highly 
marginal. Here you can give a legal answer because in both cases it is something 
that violates the legality duty’(Gjerding, 2017). Both professors agree that civil 
servants who simply choose to assist fall short of their duty to uphold the law. 
Professor Gøtze argues that civil servants are obliged by law to ‘clearly say no 
and not assist’ (answer 4), whereas Professor Henrichsen is of the opinion that 
civil servants who select either answer 3 (‘Only after a direct order, and I would 
warn my superior in unambiguous terms’) or 4 would act in accordance with 
their legal obligations. The latter is thus a broader interpretation of how far civil 
servants have to disobey superiors when they are asked to assist with clearly 
illegal acts.   
The question is then how the Bo Smith committee present the vignettes and 
the legal implications of the different answers. There are some ambiguities in the 
report, and in the statement given in response to the above-mentioned critique on 
this question. Before turning to the statements given, it is important to observe 
that the two ‘legal vignettes’ cited above are in fact just two of seven such vi-
gnettes included in the survey. The other vignettes involve norms related to 
truthfulness and observance of professional standards (BoSmith-Udvalget, 2015: 
177-187).  
In its report, the Bo Smith committee writes that the vignettes are formulated 
to ‘contain a real dilemma, which does not necessarily have an absolutely correct 
answer’ (ibid: 179). The answer categories are presented as points on an ordinal 
scale and no correct/false label is directly attached to any of the responses. In the 
comments accompanying the analysis, however, the committee appears to indi-
cate that the situations depicted are in fact scenarios that potentially involve 






breaches of law. In a comment on the findings, the committee observes that civil 
servants are hesitant with respect to setting aside the duty to act in accordance 
with the law. They explain that this is particularly evident in responses to the 
second vignette where ‘a decision is to be reached in a concrete case, and where 
the minister under reference to media coverage and public opinion wants a re-
sult, but where neither the law nor administrative practice allows it’ (ibid.: 181-
182). In this explanation, it appears as if the committee indicates that assisting 
would entail violating legal obligations, although it does not use the term ‘clearly 
illegal’ to describe the request. Discussing that employees in departments - com-
pared to agencies - are less likely to set aside legal duties, they explain that ‘min-
isterial departments often have legal units and/or legal heads, who have more 
expertise in the legal field’. Moreover, they write that civil servants there ‘are 
more aware of what is at stake, if you disregard the legal norms’ (ibid: 185). 
Normally, when we call on expertise the purpose is to get answers that are more 
correct. Not just different. It is therefore difficult to reconcile these statements 
with the general description of all the vignettes as having no legally correct or 
incorrect answers. However, it is in the comparison of the vignettes that it be-
comes clear that the situations depicted in the two legal vignettes differ from the 
other vignettes. The committee highlights this difference when explaining how 
civil servants respond to the legal versus the other vignettes. The civil servants 
are much more likely to say they will follow orders in the situations depicted 
non-legal than in the legal vignettes. The committee explains that this is ‘partly 
due to the fact that the vignettes [non-legal vignettes] are worded in such a way 
that it is possible to argue for emphasizing responsiveness [i.e. complying with 
ministerial wishes] without compromising the duty to speak the truth or the duty 
to secure a solid professional foundation’ (ibid: 182).  
It is difficult to interpret this statement as other than an acknowledgement– 
albeit indirect – of the fact that the legal vignettes do not in fact make a similar 
allowance. Here responsiveness entails a breach of legal duties. In responding to 
the abovementioned critique by the legal experts, the members of the committee 
state that they disagree with the rigid interpretation given of the vignettes. It is 
worth citing the answer in full; ‘None of the two vignettes say anything about 
whether the illegality is clear. In the first vignette, it is solely stated that the 
assessment of the office of the employee is that the legal basis is “not sufficient-
ly clear to warrant issuing the administrative rule” (Christensen et al., 2018: 98). 
The description does to indicate whether the office finds that it is clear that there 
is no legal basis, but the words “not sufficiently clear legal basis” does some-
what point in that direction’. The statement then goes on to repeat the exact same 
conclusions with respect to the proportion of civil servants whose answers are in 
accordance with their legal duties as those presented by Boye Koch and Bischoff 
(2018) that rely on the interpretation presented by Professor Henrichsen men-
tioned above. It is therefore not clear whether there really is a substantial disa-
greement. All appear to agree that answers 1 and 2 represent failure to observe 
legal duties. The disagreement lies in whether civil servants are obliged to refuse 





to assist altogether (answer 4) or whether it is sufficient for them to warn and ask 
for a direct order (answer 4). 
 
Civil servant choices: Responsiveness versus legal duties  
In the following analyses, I take a new look at the data in light of this discussion. 
First, both the narrow (only answer 4 is legal) and the broad (both answers 3 and 
4 are legal) interpretations are used to describe the proportion of Danish Civil 
servants that disregard their legal duties when prompted by the minister to do so. 
Secondly, the impact of a number of factors variables included in the survey on 
the likelihood that civil servants disregard their legal duties are investigated. In 
the final step, the statements of civil servants given in response to an open-ended 
question in the survey are examined to shed light on the issues involved in op-
posing requests from superiors in the civil service.  
 
Table 1: Proportion of civil servants that obey and violate legal duties 
The vignettes Illegal compliance in  
narrow legal interpretation 
Illegal compliance in 











basis in rules” 




Proportion of civil servants in violation of their legal duties 
Table 1 presents the share of civil servants who select an answer that in the nar-
row interpretation or the broad interpretation constitutes a violation of legal 
duties. Following the narrow legal interpretation, close to 75 pct. will do so in 
the “legal basis” scenario and just over 50 pct. will agree to assist in the “case-
decision” scenario. We might surmise from these astronomical numbers that the 
lion’s share of civil servants appear to understand their duties more in line with 
the broad legal interpretation than the narrow one. In any case, it is obvious that 
most do not seem to seem to regard refusing a request to assist as a viable option 
– and in fact several civil servants express in the open category that they do not 
see that as a real option (c.f. below). In the broader legal interpretation, a much 
smaller, but still sizable share of civil servants chooses an illegal course of ac-
tion. The numbers are around 23 pct in the “legal-basis” scenario and 8 pct. in 
the “case-decision” scenario. It thus appears that a much larger share of the civil 
servant find the option of issuing a warning and requesting direct order to com-
ply to be a more viable course of action.  
However, the fact that up to 1 in 4 civil servants select an answer that consti-
tutes a violation of their legal duties does appear to be alarmingly high. Particu-






larly, in light of the fact that these are not ordinary citizens, but representatives 
of the highest executive authority in the country and part of a highly educated 
meritocratic civil service. Moreover, considering that this is a fictive survey 
situation where no real pressure is applied, nothing is at stake, and we might 
therefore expect respondents to respond as they are expected to - ‘social desira-
bility bias’ - rather than as they would in real life (see Naher and Krumpal, 
2012). Finally, the legal situations depicted are not tricky peripheral legal issues, 
but implicate core principle of public administration law where we could expect 
awareness of legal principles to be high. In light of this, there are grounds to 
question the conclusion of the Bo Smith committee that ‘civil servants are very 
hesitant with respect to setting aside legal norms ‘ (BoSmith-Udvalget, 2015: 
181).  
 
Table 2: Explaining illegal compliance with requests 
 Case-decisions 
without basis in 
rules 
Issuing adminis-
trate law without 
legal basis 
Binary logistics regression Odds ratio Sig. Odds ratio Sig. 
Age 1,01 0,26 1,00 0,73 
Woman 1,19 0,38 0,93 0,55 
Education dummy (Reference: Law)     
 Economics (MSc) 0,68 0,46 2,14 0,01 
 Political Science (MSc) 0,95 0,89 2,35 0,00 
 Other Social Science (MA/MSc) 2,38 0,00 2,75 0,00 
 Other University (MA/MSc) 1,49 0,11 2,69 0,00 
 Other Degree 2,18 0,09 2,12 0,03 
Head dummy 0,70 0,27 0,57 0,01 
Primary tasks  
(Reference: Analysis & Policy) 
    
 Servicing Ministers 1,03 0,92 1,28 0,19 
 Case work 1,13 0,61 1,76 0,00 
 Other 0,85 0,58 1,14 0,50 
Department 0,71 0,22 0,48 0,00 
Constant 0,04 0,22 0,19 0,00 
Nagelkerks R2 3,90  8,7  
n  1616  1641  
 
What explains differences in how civil servants respond?   
Table 2 presents the results of a binary logistical analysis, where the dependent 
variable is defined in accordance with the broad legal interpretation. That is, 1 = 
illegal responsiveness to the minister’s wishes (answer 1 or 2), and 0 = when 
resistance to such wishes is expressed (answer 3 or 4). The analysis includes the 





following independent variables that were in the survey, namely: age, gender, 
education, position in the hierarchy, work place and job functions.  
As discussed above, there are much fewer respondents who chose to disre-
gard their legal duties in the ‘case-decision vignette’ and only a few of relation-
ships investigated are significant (see table 2). It would probably require a larger 
sample to analyze responses to this vignette and focus is therefore on predicting 
responses to the ‘legal basis vignette’. The results for that analysis show that 
legal training matters. Lawyers have significantly lower odds of responding to 
illegal requests by the minister than other educational groups do. In fact, the 
odds that a lawyer would disregard legal duties are less than half of what they 
are for other educational groups. The decline of lawyers in leading positions in 
the state administration is therefore not inconsequential. In the early 90’s 6 of 10 
top positions were filled by civil servants with a background in law, today it is 
down to 1 out of 4, while the number of political scientists has quadrupled 
(Hegelund and Mose, 2015). What primary job functions civil servants fulfill is 
also relevant. Working with concrete case-work increases the odds of illegal 
compliance by a factor of about 1,8  compared to working with analysis- and 
policy. It may be correct to interpret this as knowledge acquired at work, since 
when the same analysis is done for the ‘case-decision vignette’, case-workers no 
longer distinguish themselves from the other groups. However, servicing the 
minister directly does not appear to have an effect on behavior, as civil servants 
in this function do not differ in their responses from those working with analysis 
and policy. We might have expected proximity to the minister to matter, but 
there is no support for this. Position in the hierarchy clearly matters, however. 
Heads are less likely than subordinates to comply with illegal requests. This 
might be expected as they are more likely to face blame and possibly sanctions 
due to their positions in the hierarchy. The odds of illegal compliance are re-
duced by a factor 0,6 compared to their subordinates. Finally, those working in 
the departments are much less likely to set aside their legal obligations compared 
to those working in agencies. One might expect that their proximity to the minis-
ter would make compliance more likely, as mentioned above, but this is clearly 
not the case. The odds of that occurring are half compared to agency employees. 
A more cynical interpretation would be that those who work in the departments – 
as well as heads - are more keenly aware of the implications of their answers and 
thus also more strategic in their replies. The analysis reveals that age and gender 
do not matter to the responses2.  
 
What do the civil servants themselves say? 
In addition to the closed question in the survey, respondents were invited to 
comment more broadly on the theme of the survey: “In the questions above, you 
have been asked to give your best judgement on some dilemmas as a civil serv-
ant. If you would like to elaborate on your answers or provide supplementary 
remarks, you can write them here”3.  Some 386 civil servants – or 20,5 % of the 
total number of respondents - used the open category to make a comment. The 
statements are therefore not representative of all civil servants, but contain inter-






esting perspectives on the questions at hand that are worth exploring. Before 
going into the statements themselves, it is important to look at systematic pat-
terns with respect to ‘who’ used the open category. The data revealed that there 
was no significant overrepresentation of either age, sex, educational background 
or position in the organizational hierarchy. However, people employed in a de-
partment were overrepresented by some 4,5 pct. compared to agency employees. 
Primary job functions also mattered. There were some 10 pct. fewer of those 
working with concrete case work compared to the other groups (servicing minis-
ter, analysis- and policy tasks and other) who used the opportunity to express 
themselves in the open category (see details in Appendix I).  This finding sup-
ports the expectation that respondents who feel more strongly about the issues 
are more likely to take the opportunity to express themselves. In general, em-
ployees in the department and those working directly on servicing the minister or 
on analysis and policy tasks are closer to the ‘political action’ and are therefore 
more likely to feel more strongly about subject matter.  
 
Refusing to obey: Rights, duties and consequences? 
There is a high number of statements expressing that refusing to follow orders 
from a superior (option 4) is not a viable option for a civil servant. Some appear 
to doubt that they have the right – or duty -to say no, while others portray it as a 
certain death to one’s career. There were thus civil a high number of respondents 
who seemed incredulous that option four is even be on the table. Here are a few:  
 
The option you give of ‘saying clearly no and not assisting’ I find dif-
ficult to imagine as a practical possibility since it would cause severe 
trouble. - The last answer category is about refusing to do your job. 
You cannot do that.  - I don’t think that as a civil servant I can refuse 
to do what my boss/superior asks me to – I can choose to resign. - 
Naturally, as an employee you cannot ’say clearly no and not assist’ – 
that is unless you do it by finding another job. - as an ordinary em-
ployee it is very difficult to go against a leadership decision even in 
areas where you believe as a lawyer there is a lack of legal basis. – 
As a civil servant, I do not believe that I can say clearly no, but only 
warn my superior unambiguously.  
 
The reason for the clear dismissal of the possibility of saying no may rest on the 
notion that obedience and loyalty to leadership that constitute core duties of civil 
servants trumps other obligations, as discussed above. There are in fact a high 
number of statements emphasizing the responsibility of leadership. Some, as the 
following, reflect a normative emphasis on the responsibility of leadership to 
decide and subordinates to follow:  
 
Generally, I do not feel that it is my responsibility to say no to deci-
sions reached by my superiors. Not in the scenarios presented in this 





survey at least.  - … my superiors will have to say no to those higher 
up in the system. If higher levels in the system decide that we are go-
ing with a different decision that the one that I believe is right, I feel 
obligated to follow the decisions of the leadership/permanent secre-
tary. – This decision and the ensuing consequences have to belong at 
leadership or ministerial level. - A leader has to take responsibility 
and it is my job as a subordinate to follow – otherwise I have to find 
a different leader. -My course of action will generally be to argue fac-
tually and persistently and tenaciously point out that presenting false 
or incomplete information is wrong, but I will bend to the decision of 
my superior in the end. Generally, I feel…that it the decisions rest 
with my superiors and it is therefore their responsibility. - The leader 
has the responsibility. When attention has been drawn to con-
cerns/reservations then it is the responsibility of the leader to decide 
how a given case should be handled. - I find it a bit different to assess 
whether you – when you are at the bottom of the hierarchy –  ought 
only comply after a direct order and when you ought not to assist. 
Fundamentally, a superior can always overrule and thereby compel 
an employee to assist, even if the person really doesn’t want to.  
 
However, many respondents also cite loss of employment and career prospects 
as the direct reason for compliance:  
 
‘I would clearly say no and not assist’ entails dismissal or another 
‘sanction’ like having assignments taken from you or losing career 
prospects. If you have done it once, I don’t think you will want to do 
it again”.  – “ I would generally say no in the aforementioned cases, 
but end up giving in as a no to comply with orders could end in a 
dismissal or degradation” – ”I have not made use of the option ’I 
would clearly say no and not assist’ because my many years in civil 
service functions tell me that ‘you cannot do that’ if you want to con-
tinue being in the system”  - “the option of saying clearly no and not 
assisting would probably be viewed by many as the prelude to writ-
ing your own redundancy notice”. “Refusing to carry out an order 
would be to make oneself impossible in a way that would be strongly 
detrimental to a future career. - ” It is evident that as a civil servant 
you have to deliver what is politically in demand – irrespective of 
whether it is professionally defensible or not. If you cannot deliver 
what is being asked of you, you will be deemed uncooperative and 
might as well begin to look for another place to work! 
 
The concern for consequences is also reflected in the documentation-strategy 
used by civil servants to deal with requests believed to be contrary to law. Many 
civil servants emphasize the importance of not only voicing their concerns and 






providing relevant facts to their superiors, but also making sure that a paper trail 
exists that can exonerate them from blame should the actions attract attention 
and come under scrutiny later on;  
 
I have to obey my superior or minister – and then I have to create 
protect myself by being able to document that I have raised concerns 
etc. if the issue arises at some a later point.” – To me, it is completely 
clear that I will of course do as I am told, but when I believe that 
something is illegal, I will always send my reservations in writing to 
my superior. – It is not fun to be the one who points to the illegality 
of a desired solution. I do it routinely if I believe it is illegal. But if 
my superior wants the illegal solution I carry out the task and make 
sure to protect myself with the necessary documentation. - I would 
‘comply’ with my superior’s request… But I would in every single 
case make a note with my assessments, recommendations and the or-
der from my superior that are put on file. Then, one can only hope 
that the note is deemed to belong with documents covered by the 
public information act, if a request to access documents pertaining to 
the case is submitted later”  – I have in a few cases handled it by 
sending my reservations (by mail) to my superior with an eye to plac-
ing the responsibility on the leadership….I have saved these mails as 
documentation that I as a civil servant have tried to show “due dili-
gence” and that I want to place responsibility elsewhere.  – In diffi-
cult dilemmas, I use his method to force my superior to issue a clear 
order and get documentation for my superiors’ decision in the form 
of an email correspondence or minutes from a conversation that are 
journalized on the case.  – …I would do the practical work, but ask 
my superior to sign it if I cannot vouch for the result myself. - ..I 
know employees who certainly feel that they have been overruled in 
matters pertaining to facts and decisions, and whose learning partly 
consists in documenting all correspondence, partly distrust of leader-
ship and some resignation.  
 
The statements appear to reflect a belief by the civil servants that they can es-
cape legal ramifications if they can only document their concerns and the re-
quests/orders issued by their superiors. On the other hand, it also gives evidence 
of a concern for possible personal consequences of action taken and not only 
whether they are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ per se.  
 
Political pressure: Sources and directions?  
Not surprisingly, in a hierarchical organization such as the state administration, 
directions flow from the top. The minister – her agenda or interests - is frequent-
ly mentioned as a source of political pressure. Statements such as: 






Sometimes it feels as if we are campaigning for the minister” or “The 
reality today is that ministers and their spin doctors demand the solu-
tion they believe will positions the minister best in the public eye 
 
identify the minister as the source of political pressure. Many also emphasize the 
role of top civil servants and leadership in general in facilitating this, however: 
 
Under XX minister’s ‘reign’ there was a clear tendency for politi-
cized case work (sagsbehandling) in the agency (styrelse) and it was 
shocking that the top tiers of leadership just played along without a 
murmur”. Some civil servant point out that it can be difficult to dis-
tinguish between political and bureaucratic sources of pressure: “pos-
sibly the request does not originate with the minister every time, but 
the politicization and the wish to present the numbers in an advanta-
geous manner is present in both leadership and middle-management 
layers” or “[I] cannot see if it [the political pressure] stems from the 
minister herself or from ambitious bosses who want to please the 
minister by giving what they think she wants.   
 
In addition to leadership in general, it is clear that for civil servants working in 
one of the agencies, the ‘department’ is viewed as a major source of political 
pressure. For instance:  The department rarely accepts a ‘no’ regardless how 
great the uncertainty associated with the notes/calculations is” or “The pressure 
comes from the department that repeatedly sends the same comments and want 
the same things erased”. One civil servants mentions working on a report  
 
Where certain information was left out and certain formulations were 
softened because they might reflect poorly on the minister. The de-
partment took the decision even though as professionals in the agen-
cy, we had raised concerns several times.  
 
Or as one civil servant bluntly comments: “it is a problem that the directors and 
the department interferes in concrete cases”. However, other civil servants de-
scribe pressures coming simply from their superior without specifying a particu-
lar position in the hierarchy:  
 
If my superior requests a particular direction then I have to find the 
arguments/numbers and analyses that indicate that direction, which 
can often be difficult. 
 
Political pressures are also described as deeply embedded in the organization. 
Some indicate that they experience a bureaucracy whose whole culture and iden-






tity appears to be skewed towards political expedience at the expense of adher-
ence to civil service norms and standards: 
 
I started out in a very rule-based, but also heavy civil service, but we 
now operate in a very political and solution-oriented environment, 
where legal considerations from being a basic condition has become 
something that can best be described as a disturbing formalistic ele-
ment. 
 
This perception is echoed by the experiences of a lawyer who says that “my 
profession – the lawyers – is frowned upon. It is in the air that we are reaction-
aries and those that always say ‘no’ and cannot think politically”.  
The types of pressures mentioned by the respondents are different in nature. 
As mentioned in the citations above, pressures to bias letters, reports, proposals 
to support a particular political agenda, special interests or media are mentioned 
in the comments. As one civil servant says:  
 
It is particularly with respect to finding an angle for press releases 
and letters to parliament (FT breve) that there can be problems bal-
ancing civil service standards and political considerations, and where 
you can feel you are pushed to a certain presentation of a matter 
 
While another comments that  
 
It is mostly in connection with the final brush-up of political pro-
posals that I have experienced being exposed to massive pressure in 
the form of erasing information from texts with the result that the 
texts appear incorrect 
 
Some express that the pressure is in a grey area:  
 
It is not necessarily something which is flat-out wrong, but perhaps 
just watered down to such an extent, that there is wide scope for in-
terpretation so you can always read a positive angle into it. We are 
really good at that.  
 
There are fewer examples of pressures towards direct illegalities, but they are 
there and describe situations ranging from pressures to change particular case-
decisions to broadly being asked to sign off on legislative proposals contrary to 
higher order law.  One civil servants describes being asked to “find a paragraph 
to base a denial of a request for access to public records even though in my legal 
opinion there was no basis for such refusal” and further admits “I didn’t dare to 





hold my ground and rejected the request”. Some describe situations where bills 
are being pushed through that do not accord with higher order law:  
 
How do you, for example, answer your boss the third time he/she 
states that it is not a question of whether a particular initiative can be 
executed, but how it can happen? … How do you deal with the fact 
that you are informed that the EU-office in the Ministry of Justice 
will not be heard even though the initiative is about XX [a key issue 
for EU law] because they will only say “no” (if you try to get a se-
cond opinion and something to anchor your arguments to.  
 
Several statements underscore how legal uncertainty can be abused to push 
through illegal acts: 
 
It is very rare that we can say with a 100 % certainty that something 
will be illegal in relationship to the EU so we pass the proposal in 
spite of the fact that we are 99,9 %. sure that Denmark will lose the 
case at the European Court of Justice. It is politically forgotten in 2-5 
years anyway when the case has worked its way through the system.  
 
Discussion of results  
What conclusions we draw from the analysis? It is always a difficult exercise to 
determine how much ‘deviance’ from the norms constitutes a threat to the health 
of a system. It is simply impossible to give a precise answer to this. Nonetheless, 
when the number of those who do not abide by their legal duties is as high as 1 
out of 4 in a fictive scenario with none of the pressures of real life, it should at 
least raise eyebrows and be the starting point of a serious discussion. Politicians 
need bureaucracies that serve their political agendas in order to rule effectively. 
In Denmark, the civil service has become ‘professionally politicized’, which 
holds the promise of combining high levels of skill with high levels of political 
responsiveness. The question is whether it has come at the cost of maintaining 
professional norms. The quantitative analysis supports that education – and pos-
sibly training on the job – matters. It is likely that awareness of responsibility – 
and the threat of sanctions - can explain why heads as well as department em-
ployees are less likely to transgress legal norms. Some of the comments by civil 
servants indicate that perceptions of responsibility may in fact not be in line with 
their legal duties. It would require more research to investigate and validate these 
findings, however. The data does not allow us to assess how many hold the 
views expressed, since civil servants were not asked directly. If the findings are 
validated by further studies, one path to take would be to increase the share of 
lawyers in the administration and providing better training to raise awareness of 
responsibilities would make civil servants less likely to deviate from their legal 
duties. However, if the experience of civil servants in their jobs is that resisting 






requests from superiors comes at the cost of career or even job, it is unlikely that 
education and raising awareness will do the trick. In that case, other institutional 
solutions would be required. There is a need for further studies that give us better 
insight into the experiences, perceptions and values of civil servants before pos-
sible solutions can be discussed.  
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